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Carnero v. Boston Scientific
Corporation: Interpreting the
Extraterritorial Effect of the Civil
Whistleblower Protection Provision
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
By CARYN R. Nu-rr*
EVERY YEAR, PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD invest tril-
lions of dollars in the United States securities markets.I In 2001, inves-
tor confidence was shaken when Enron, the seventh largest company
on Fortune Magazine's list of the top 500, filed for Chapter Eleven
bankruptcy in United States Bankruptcy Court.2 To restore public
confidence in the safety of the United States securities markets, Con-
gress hastily enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley
Act").3 A key component of this legislation was the civil whistleblower
protection provision 4 ("Whistleblower Provision"), which created a
federal cause of action for employees of publicly-traded companies,
* Class of 2007. B.A., University of Washington, 2001. Comments Editor, US.E Law
Review, Volume 41. 1 would like to thank my parents for their unwavering support of my
educational endeavors and other flights of fancy. I would also like to thank my friend and
editor, Melissa Brown, for her insightful comments and tireless efforts in working with me
to bring this piece to publication.
1. See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, A GUIDE TO
THE NYSE MARKETPLACE (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse bluebook.
pdf. As ofJune 30, 2006, the shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange represented a
total global market capitalization of over $22.6 trillion. Id.
2. J. Michael Anderson, Enron: A Select Chronology of Congressional, Corporate,
and Government Activities, at Summary (Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress RL31364, 2002); see also Corinne A. Falencki, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Pre-
sumption Against Extraterritoriality, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1211, 1212-13 (2004).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.). See infra Part Il.A.2
for further discussion of the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2005).
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like Enron, who were fired in retaliation for "blowing the whistle" on
fraudulent accounting practices and other corporate wrongdoing.5 By
offering employees of publicly-traded companies the same protections
afforded government whistleblowers, Congress sought to decrease the
chances that another Enron-like scandal would threaten investor con-
fidence in the United States securities markets.
6
In drafting the Whistleblower Provision, Congress failed to con-
sider potential complications arising from an increasingly intercon-
nected world. The provision does not explicitly protect, nor does it
explicitly exempt from protection, employees working abroad for for-
eign subsidiaries of United States corporations. Absent explicit statu-
tory language, the courts must employ other methods to determine
whether extraterritorial application is appropriate. Should the protec-
tion of the Whistleblower Provision apply to employees retaliated
against for reporting the corporate fraud of subsidiary companies, al-
lowing such employees to bring suit against the United States parent
company? In an increasingly global economy, can the intent of the
provision be effectuated without such application? The First Circuit
was called upon to answer these questions in Carnero v. Boston Scientific
Corp.7
The action in Carnero stemmed from an employment dispute be-
tween plaintiff Ruben Carnero and defendant Boston Scientific Cor-
poration ("BSC"). 8 Carnero alleged that BSC terminated his
employment in retaliation for whistleblowing when he informed BSC
that a number of its Latin American subsidiaries had created false in-
voices and inflated sales figures. 9 Carnero filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the
Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 10 BSC argued that
Carnero, as an Argentinean citizen working for its Latin American
subsidiaries in Brazil, was not entitled to file suit under the
Whistleblower Provision. 1
In deciding that the Whistleblower Provision did not have extra-
territorial effect, the First Circuit employed a presumption against ex-
5. Id.
6. 148 CONG. REc. S1788 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
7. 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
8. See id. at 2.
9. Id.
10. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 04-10031-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17205, at *1 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2004) (denying Carnero's petition for certiorari).
11. Id. at *3.
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traterritorial application of congressional action.' 2 However, this
territoriality presumption is only one of the recently applied ap-
proaches for deciding if legislation should have extraterritorial ef-
fect-there was nothing to prevent the First Circuit from employing
an effects-based analysis in deciding this issue.' 3 At the time Carnero
was decided, the Supreme Court had embraced both the presumption
against extraterritoriality and an effects test without providing gui-
dance as to which approach should govern legislation in the field of
securities regulation.' 4 This Comment will show that, had the First
Circuit employed the effects test, the court could have logically
reached the conclusion that the Whistleblower Provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act should have extraterritorial effect.
The choice between these two possible approaches has serious
implications for the outcome of a case. The territoriality presumption
is unnecessarily limiting in many contexts and often does not allow
the court to facilitate the underlying congressional intent behind the
legislation. In contrast, the effects test allows the court more flexibility
and is better suited to deal with unforeseen international applications
of legislation. This flexibility allows the court system to uphold con-
gressional intent even when extraterritorial effect is not expressly pro-
vided for. The effects test analysis refocuses the inquiry by looking to
the location of an action's effect rather than fixating on the physical
location of that action.
The existence of competing analyses for determining the extra-
territorial effect of United States legislation will inevitably give rise to
conflict. Although the First Circuit chose to apply the territoriality
presumption, the other circuit courts are free to adopt a competing
approach. The Supreme Court's failure to embrace one approach
leaves the door open for confusion in the lower courts and will likely
lead to conflicting case law. In declining to hear this case, the Su-
preme Court missed an important opportunity to set the standard for
extraterritoriality analysis of legislation in the field of securities regula-
tion. 15 Given the global economy, in which companies routinely oper-
ate in numerous countries around the world, the Court must
recognize the need to adopt a standard for analyzing the extraterrito-
12. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 7.
13. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 595
(John Berger ed., 3d ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 1996).
14. Id. See infra Part II for a discussion of these two approaches recently adopted by
the Supreme Court to analyze the extraterritorial effect of congressional legislation.
15. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 05-1397, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4956, at *1
(2006).
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riality of legislation in the field of securities regulation. In recognition
of the complexity of securities regulation, the Court should embrace
the flexible approach of the effects test.
Part I of this Comment presents the circumstances of Ruben
Carnero's employment with BSC, the termination of his employment,
and the ensuing litigation. Part II introduces the territoriality pre-
sumption and the effects test, both of which were recently employed
by the Supreme Court in analyzing the extraterritorial effect of con-
gressional action. The facts of Carnero will be analyzed under each of
these approaches to illustrate the limitations of the territoriality pre-
sumption and the benefits of the effects test analysis for determining
the extraterritorial effect of the Whistleblower Provision. Part III con-
cludes by encouraging the Supreme Court to adopt the effects test
analysis to determine the extraterritorial effect of the Whistleblower
Provision or, alternatively, to adopt the test as a standard for the analy-
sis of the extraterritorial effect of legislation enacted in the field of
securities regulation.
I. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corporation: The First Circuit's
Decision Not to Protect Those Who "Blow the
Whistle" Outside the United States
Ruben Carnero, a citizen of Argentina, resided in Brazil at the
time of the First Circuit's decision. 16 Between 1997 and 2003, he was
employed by two Latin American subsidiaries of BSC, a Delaware cor-
poration headquartered in Massachusetts.1 7 In 1997, Carnero began
working for Boston Scientific Argentina S.A. ("BSA"), the Argentin-
ean subsidiary of BSC. 18 He entered into an employment agreement
with BSA in Argentina, although the agreement was negotiated in
many countries, including the United States. 19 The agreement was
governed by the laws of Argentina and specified BSA's headquarters
in Buenos Aires as Carnero's place of work.20 In 2001, Carnero ac-
cepted concurrent employment with the Brazilian subsidiary of BSC,
Boston Scientific Do Brasil Ltda. ("BSB"). 21 In the course of his em-
ployment, Carnero discovered that BSA and BSB were involved in cre-
ating false invoices and improperly inflating sales figures, and he
16. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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reported this accounting misconduct to BSC. 22 Carnero asserted that
he was terminated from BSB in August 2002 and BSA in April 2003 in
retaliation for reporting the accounting misconduct of BSB and BSA
to supervisors at BSC. 23
Following the termination of his employment, Carnero initiated
three actions, including an administrative complaint against BSC with
the United States Department of Labor.24 In the administrative com-
plaint, Carnero alleged retaliatory termination and other instances of
discrimination in violation of the Whistleblower Provision. 25 In De-
cember 2003, the Department of Labor issued a preliminary decision
dismissing the administrative complaint after finding that the
Whistleblower Provision did not apply to employees, such as Carnero,
working outside of the United States. 26 Carnero then filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts, seeking de novojudicial review of the claim. 27 Carnero brought
suit under the Whistleblower Provision, which creates both the admin-
istrative complaint procedure with the Department of Labor and "a
federal civil cause of action, designed to protect the 'employees of
publicly traded companies' who lawfully 'provide information ... or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee believes constitutes a violation' ... of any rule or regulation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission" ("SEC") or any other
fraud-related provision of federal law.28 The district court dismissed
22. Id. at 2-3.
23. Id.
24. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 04-10031-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17205, at *1 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2004). The other actions initiated by Carnero at this time
included a conciliation proceeding in Argentina seeking statutory severance and an eight-
count complaint against BSC in the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts that was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 3.
25. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 3.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Id. at 5 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514(A)(a) (West 2005)). The full text of the
Whistleblower Provision provides:
Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies. No com-
pany with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 781), or that is required to file reports under
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)), or any
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may dis-
charge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by employee-
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise
assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reason-
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Carnero's Whisfleblower Provision claim. 29 The court held that
Carnero, as an Argentinean citizen who resided and worked in Brazil
for the Latin American subsidiaries of BSC, could not sue BSC under
the Whistleblower Provision for allegedly retaliatory conduct that took
place outside the United States because the provision was without ex-
traterritorial effect.30
On appeal, the First Circuit was called upon to decide if the
Whisfleblower Provision should be interpreted to have extraterritorial
effect, extending its protection to cover foreign employees com-
plaining of misconduct abroad by overseas subsidiaries. 31 If such ex-
traterritorial effect were found, covered employees in foreign
countries, such as Carnero, would be permitted to bring suit under
the Whistleblower Provision against the United States parent company
in response to retaliatory termination by a foreign subsidiary. 32 The
First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Carnero was a covered
employee for the purposes of the Whistleblower Provision and that
there was evidence that his employment was terminated in retaliation
for protected conduct.33
ably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348 [18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348], any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders . . . ; or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a
proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer)
relating to an alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348 [18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348], any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2005).
29. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6-7.
32. Id. at 6. See generally John B. Chiara & Michael D. Orenstein, Note, Whist/er's
Nocturne in Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket: Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision
Falls Short of the Mark, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 235 (2005) for a discussion of the
requirements to maintain an action under the Whistleblower Provision. The plaintiff must
prove his or her prima facie case by showing "by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)
she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew of the protected activity; (3) she
suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) circumstances exist to suggest that the
protected activity was a contributing factor to the unfavorable action." Id. at 260 (citing
Collins v. Beazer Homes, USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). If the
plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that they would
have taken the unfavorable personnel action even if the protected activity had not oc-
curred. Id.
33. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 6. In Carnero, the court discussed two theories under which
Carnero may have been an "employee" of BSC for the purposes of seeking relief under the
Whistleblower Provision. Id. Carnero first claimed that he was supervised by BSC personnel
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In deciding whether the Whistleblower Provision applied extra-
territorially, the First Circuit considered the text of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the legislative history surrounding its enactment, past pre-
cedent in which legislation had been determined not to have extrater-
ritorial effect, and the policies both in favor and against extending the
effect of the Whistleblower Provision.34 After a detailed analysis, the
court determined that the Whistleblower Provision did not reflect the
"necessary clear expression of congressional intent" to extend the
reach of the provision to foreign employees working outside of the
United States.35
H. Imparting Extraterritorial Effect to the Whistleblower
Provision: Should Legislation in the Field of
Securities Regulation Be Limited by the
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Effect?
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has embraced two differ-
ent approaches to analyze the extraterritorial effect of congressional
legislation. In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. ("Aramco") .36 The
Court applied the traditional territoriality presumption analysis under
which congressional legislation is assumed to apply only within the
United States unless Congress expressly provides for the legislation to
apply extraterritorially. 37 The Court determined that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196438 did not apply to regulate the employment
practices of a United States company that employed a United States
citizen to work in Saudi Arabia. 39 A short two years later, the Supreme
Court decided Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,40 in which the
working at the company's Massachusetts headquarters, and that this interaction made him
an employee of BSC as well as an employee of the company's foreign subsidiaries. Id. In
addition, the First Circuit also recognized, in dicta, that Carnero's employment with BSA
and BSB may qualify him as an employee of BSC under the Department of Labor regula-
tions defining "employee" for the Whistleblower Provision as those "presently or formerly
working for a [publicly-traded] company or company representative." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1980.101 (2005)). The court opined that "[i]f BSA and BSB were agents of BSC, as seems
quite possible, their own employee would fit this definition of the parent's 'employee."' Id.
This Comment will adopt the First Circuit's assumptions on this point.
34. Id. at 9-18.
35. Id. at 18.
36. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
37. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
38. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
39. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259.
40. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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Court adopted an effects test approach to hold that provisions of the
Sherman Act could be applied extraterritorially if they were meant to
affect and did produce an effect in the United States.4 1 In deciding
Hartford Fire Insurance, the Supreme Court made no reference to the
territoriality presumption that it embraced in Aramco just two years
earlier.42 In declining to hear Carnero and, thereby, declining to clarify
which of these competing approaches should be used to determine
the extraterritorial effect of legislation in the field of securities regula-
tion, the Supreme Court opened the door for confusion among lower
courts and litigants. 43 This potential confusion can be demonstrated
through an analysis of Carnero under both the territoriality presump-
tion, as employed by the First Circuit, and the effects test, which re-
mains a viable alternative method of analysis.
A. Analysis #1: The Territoriality Presumption as Applied to the
Whistleblower Provision
The territoriality presumption is based on two recognized princi-
ples of law in the United States. The first principle sets forth Con-
gress's undisputed authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. 44 However, this principle is tem-
pered by the equally accepted principle that "legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 45 This second principle is
the foundation of the territoriality presumption.
Determining whether Congress intended to exercise its recog-
nized authority to grant legislation extraterritorial effect is a matter of
statutory interpretation. 46 Where congressional action is silent as to its
territorial reach and Congress manifests no intent to extend its reach
beyond domestic borders, the territoriality approach employs a pre-
sumption against extraterritorial effect.47 This presumption assumes
that Congress is primarily concerned with enacting legislation to deal
with domestic conditions.48 The territoriality presumption also "re-
flects the principle of international comity, under which the United
41. Id. at 796.
42. BORN, supra note 13, at 595.
43. Id.
44. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
45. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
46. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
47. Id.
48. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
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States should avoid interference with the laws of another sovereign
over conduct occurring within its territory."49
Although the territoriality presumption typically operates to limit
the reach of legislation to application only within the territorial
boundaries of the United States unless Congress has expressly con-
ferred extraterritorial authority, there are cases in which the requisite
intent has been implied.5 0 As the First Circuit points out in Carnero,
"in appropriate circumstances Congress's extraterritorial intent has
on occasion been implied without explicit statement in the text or
even history."51 In determining if implied intent is appropriate, courts
typically look to the "context and structure" of a statute as well as "its
purpose and 'all available evidence." 52
In Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo,53 an early case dealing with the
presumption against extraterritorial effect and the method of evaluat-
ing implied congressional intent, the Supreme Court was called upon
to determine if the Federal Eight Hour Law5 4 was applicable to an
employment contract in a foreign country.55 In Foley Bros., the plain-
tiff, an American citizen, was employed by the defendant on behalf of
the United States in Iran and Iraq.56 The plaintiff alleged that he fre-
quently worked more than eight hours per day and filed suit claiming
he was entitled to one and one-half times the basic rate of pay for
those excess hours under the provisions of the Federal Eight Hour
Law.5 7
In deciding Foley Bros., the Supreme Court employed a three-part
statutory interpretation analysis to determine if the Federal Eight
49. Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
50. Examples of such implied intent include Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding that the Sherman Act applied to anti-competitive conduct
abroad that was "meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States"), Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that the
Securities Exchange Act had extraterritorial effect "at least when the transactions involve
stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the
interests of American investors"), and Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390
(1948) (extending the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act to contractors engaged
in construction for the United States government on naval bases located in Bermuda and
leased from Great Britain upon determining that the term possession was intended to in-
clude such bases).
51. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006).
52. Id.
53. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
54. See id. at 282 (discussing 27 Stat. 340, as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26, repealed by
Work Hours Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-581, title II § 203, 76 Stat. 360 (1962)).
55. Id. at 283-84.
56. Id. at 283.
57. Id.
Fall 20061
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Hour Law should have extraterritorial effect. 58 The three-part test em-
ployed by the Foley Bros. court consisted of: (1) a textual analysis of the
language, (2) an examination of the legislative history, and (3) an ex-
amination of the administrative interpretations throughout the devel-
opment of the Federal Eight Hour Law.5 9 After conducting this
statutory analysis, the Foley Bros. court held that the Federal Eight
Hour Law did not have extraterritorial effect. 60
As Carnero raised a similar question of statutory interpretation,
the First Circuit used a similar analysis to the one employed by the
Supreme Court in Foley Bros. to determine if, under the territoriality
presumption, the Whistleblower Provision should have extraterritorial
effect.6 1 In addition to analyzing the three factors addressed by the
Foley Bros. court, the First Circuit considered policy and precedent in
its ultimate determination that the Whistleblower Provision did not
demonstrate the requisite congressional intent to endorse extraterri-
torial application. 62
1. The Text of the Whistleblower Provision Does Not Demonstrate
Intent to Impart Extraterritorial Effect
The first step in statutory interpretation is to conduct a close
reading of the statute in question.63 Carnero filed suit under the
Whistleblower Provision, which provides "a federal civil cause of ac-
tion, designed to protect the 'employees of publicly traded compa-
nies' who lawfully 'provide information . . . or otherwise assist in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee believes con-
stitutes a violation' . . . of any rule or regulation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission" or any other fraud-related provision of fed-
eral law. 64
58. Id. at 285-91.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court held that the text of the Eight Hour Law did not provide the Court
with a showing that Congress intended extraterritorial application of the provision. Id. at
285. Additionally, the Court held that the legislative history demonstrated that Congress
was primarily concerned with domestic labor conditions when it enacted the Eight Hour
Law. Id. at 286. The Court also found that, despite one Executive Order which seemed to
acknowledge the possibility of extraterritorial application, the administrative interpreta-
tions of the Eight Hour Law did not support a finding of extraterritorial application. Id. at
288.
61. 433 F.3d 1, 9-15 (1st Cir. 2006).
62. Id. at 15-18.
63. See, e.g., Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
64. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 5 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2005)). See supra
note 28 for the full text of the Whistleblower Provision.
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Judicial construction of congressional action should start "with
the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used. ''65 Although the Whistleblower Provi-
sion is silent as to its territorial reach, two textual aspects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be read to provide insight into Congress's in-
tent regarding extraterritorial application of the provision. First, Con-
gress failed to consider problems arising from overseas application of
the Whistleblower Provision. This is especially persuasive in light of
the fact that such difficulties were considered in other sections of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Second, Congress expressly provided for the ex-
traterritorial application of a criminal whistleblower statute elsewhere
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Criminal Whistleblower Provision").66
In enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress recognized the dif-
ficulties that its application to persons abroad would present and ex-
pressly dealt with those difficulties in several sections of the Act.67 One
such instance is the accounting provision contained in section 106 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 68 In recognition of the difficulties of enforc-
ing United States regulatory statutes abroad, this section permits the
SEC to exempt foreign accounting firms from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
as it "determines necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." 69 The inclusion of this exemption dem-
onstrates that Congress recognized the need to explicitly provide for
the extraterritorial application of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and to deal with any difficulties that might arise from applying
those provisions abroad.
Congress did not exhibit any such concern over application of
the Whistleblower Provision abroad and notably failed to address the
difficulties likely to arise from extraterritorial application of the provi-
sion. Congress also failed to provide any mechanism that would allow
for extraterritorial enforcement of the Whistleblower Provision. 70 Ad-
ditionally, Congress did not grant the Department of Labor, the
agency charged with receiving and investigating whistleblower claims
under the administrative complaint procedure, any powers that would
permit extraterritorial investigation of claims. 71 Congressional failure
to address administrative issues likely to arise from extraterritorial ap-
65. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
66. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West 2005).
67. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 14-15.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 7216(c) (2000).
69. Id.
70. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 15.
71. Id.
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plication of the Whistleblower Provision may demonstrate a lack of
congressional intent that the provision be granted extraterritorial
effect.
Another textual illustration of Congress's intent that the
Whistleblower Provision not apply extraterritorially is the express grant
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Criminal Whistleblower Provi-
sion.72 In interpreting congressional action, it is logical to presume
that when "Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, . . . Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion. '7 3 The Criminal Whistleblower Provision provides an express
grant of extraterritorial federal jurisdiction for criminal sanctions
against anyone who "takes any action harmful to any person, includ-
ing interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any per-
son."74 The inclusion of this express grant of extraterritorial
jurisdiction demonstrates that Congress considered the possibility that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would have international implications. Know-
ing that international issues were likely to arise, Congress constructed
statutory language to deal with the problems of extraterritorial juris-
diction and addressed those problems explicitly in the language of the
Criminal Whistleblower Provision. This explicit grant of territorial ju-
risdiction in the Criminal Whistleblower Provision is significant as it
transforms the silence of the Whistleblower Provision as to its territo-
rial reach into a conspicuous silence under the territoriality presump-
tion and may indicate a lack of intent that the civil provision be
granted extraterritorial effect.
Although the Whistleblower Provision is silent as to its territorial
reach, the textual construction of both the Whistleblower Provision
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in general may counsel in favor of finding
that Congress did not intend the Whistleblower Provision to apply ex-
traterritorially. Congressional failure to consider the problems arising
from extraterritorial application of this provision (when such consid-
72. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(d) (West 2005).
73. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citing United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
74. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(d)-(e) (West 2005). This section of the Act expressly provides
that "[t]here is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section." 18
U.S.C.A. § 1513(d). An offense under this section is committed by anyone who "knowingly,
with intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with
the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement
officer or any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of
any Federal offense.. . ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(e).
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erations informed the drafting of other provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act) demonstrates a lack of congressional intent that the
Whistleblower Provision have extraterritorial effect. Additionally, the
explicit provision of extraterritorial effect for the Criminal
Whistleblower Provision shows that Congress was concerned with ex-
traterritorial application of certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and legislated to facilitate such application where appropriate.
A close reading of the Whistleblower Provision itself, silent as to
its territorial reach, does not provide an answer to whether the provi-
sion has extraterritorial effect. However, one is left to question
whether this silence was intentional or merely a legislative oversight.
Although the text of other sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be
read to support the proposition that the Whistleblower Provision's si-
lence limits its extraterritorial application, it is dangerous to read si-
lence as an affirmative expression of a statute's provisions. When
basing a decision on a textual analysis of statutory language, reading
textual silence to imply limitations on the statute's application may
frustrate congressional intent in enacting the statute.
2. The Legislative History of the Whistleblower Provision Does
Not Demonstrate Intent to Impart Extraterritorial Effect
Textual analysis is only the first step in determining if congres-
sional action should be granted extraterritorial effect under the terri-
toriality presumption. When there is no express grant of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, a court may also consider the legislation's
"purpose and all other available evidence. '75 The legislative history of
the congressional action in question is a key part of this inquiry.
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a reaction to the sud-
den collapse of the Enron Corporation in December 2001.76 In early
2001, Enron was one of the most prestigious corporations in the
United States, with assets totaling over $49 billion and a ranking by
Fortune Magazine as the seventh largest corporation in the United
States.77 On December 2, 2001, Enron unexpectedly filed for Chapter
Eleven bankruptcy in United States Bankruptcy Court.78 The next day,
Enron announced the layoff of 4000 employees. 79 In the wake of the
filing, the stock price of Enron plummeted, decimating the invest-
75. See, e.g., Carnero, 433 F.3d at 8.
76. Falencki, supra note 2, at 1211.
77. Anderson, supra note 2, at Summary.
78. Id. at CRS-18.
79. Id.
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ments and retirement savings of families throughout the United
States.8 0 The ultimate collapse of Enron was largely attributable to in-
dividual Enron executives who chose to ignore questionable account-
ing practices that, temporarily and with disastrous consequences,
caused the overvaluation of Enron stock.81 The investigation following
the collapse of Enron brought Arthur Andersen, Enron's accounting
firm, into the scandal after it was revealed that the firm destroyed "a
significant but undetermined number" of documents relating to its
dealings with Enron.82
The collapse of Enron and the subsequent scandal involving Ar-
thur Andersen peaked congressional interest in enacting legislation to
combat corporate fraud and regulate corporate financial accounting
practices. 83 Legislative focus was heightened when over one hundred
companies corrected financial results that had already been an-
nounced for the first half of 2002.84 This nearly doubled the number
of corrections averaged in previous decades.8 5 Concerns about the
United States securities markets were not limited to domestic inves-
tors; the reaction abroad to these scandals led many international in-
vestors to be wary of investing on the New York Stock Exchange.86
Congress hastily enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in this post-scandal
environment both to restore public confidence in the United States
securities markets and to monitor and investigate possible acts of cor-
porate fraud and violations of securities regulations. 87
Senator Leahy introduced the Whistleblower Provision on March
12, 2002.88 Senator Leahy emphasized, on behalf of himself and the
bill's co-sponsors, the importance of restoring confidence in the integ-
rity of United States markets and the role that the proposed
Whistleblower Provision would play in achieving that goal.89 His re-
marks focused, in part, on changes necessary to provide meaningful
80. Falencki, supra note 2, at 1213. During the 2001 fiscal year, the value of a share of
Enron stock fell from eighty-five dollars to thirty cents. Chiara & Orenstein, supra note 32,
at 236.
81. Chiara & Orenstein, supra note 32, at 236.
82. Anderson, supra note 2, at CRS-17.
83. Falencki, supra note 2, at 1213. See also Mark Jickling, Accounting Problems Re-
ported in Major Companies Since Enron (Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress RS21269, 2003).
84. Jickling, supra note 83, at CRS-I.
85. Id.
86. Falencki, supra note 2, at 1213.
87. 148 CONG. REc. S1786 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
88. Id. at S1785.
89. Id. at S1786.
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whistleblower protection within the United States.90 Two perceived
problems at the center of the discussion were: (1) the lack of federal
protection for employees of publicly-traded companies coming for-
ward to report corporate wrongdoing and (2) the inconsistencies of
state law in providing protection for whistleblowers working for pub-
licly-traded companies.9' The first of these perceived problems
stemmed from the fact that federal law protected many government
employees from retaliation if they reported wrongdoing, but provided
no similar protection for employees of publicly-traded companies who
acted in the public interest by reporting fraud or other wrongdoing by
the corporation.9 2  The second perceived problem that the
Whistleblower Provision was intended to combat was the "patchwork
and vagaries of current State laws" that failed to provide consistent
protections across state lines.9 3 Congress designed the Whistleblower
Provision to alleviate both of these problems by providing a federal
cause of action for employees of publicly-traded companies who were
retaliated against after they "blew the whistle" on a company's fraudu-
lent behavior or other wrongdoing.9 4
Despite the lack of expressed intent to imbue the Whistleblower
Provision with extraterritorial effect, the legislative history demon-
strates a strong intent that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, generally, and the
Whistleblower Provision, specifically, sweep broadly to protect markets
from fraudulent activity that is damaging to investors.9 5 On January
29, 2003, Senator Leahy again addressed the Senate regarding the
Whistleblower Provision.9 6 He spoke about a change in the White
House's interpretation of the Whistleblower Provision.9 7 In keeping
90. See id. at S1787-S1788.
91. Id. at S1788.
92. Id.
93. Id. The Congressional Record includes an email from one of Enron's lawyers writ-
ten in response to a request for legal advice after an Enron employee attempted to report
accounting irregularities in August, 2001. Id. at S1791. The email reads:
You also asked that I include in this communication a summary of the possible
risks associated with discharging (or constructively discharging) employees who
report allegations of improper accounting practices: 1. Texas law does not cur-
rently protect corporate whistleblowers. The supreme court [sic] has twice de-
clined to create a cause of action for whistleblowers who are discharged ....
Id. at S1792.
94. See id. at S1788.
95. See generally 149 CONG. REc. S1725 (2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 148 CONG.
REC. S1786 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Chiara & Orenstein, supra note 32; Falencki,
supra note 2.
96. 149 CONG. REC. S1725 (2003).
97. Id. Initially, the executive branch narrowly interpreted the Whistleblower Provi-
sion to protect only those disclosures made to a congressional committee already con-
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with the previously stated purpose, Senator Leahy said that "[t] he law
was intentionally written to sweep broadly, protecting any employee of
a publicly traded company who took such reasonable action to try to
protect investors and the market."98
The Senate discussions regarding the Whistleblower Provision
were limited to the benefits of enacting the provision within the
United States. 99 Concerns expressed included the domestic problems
that led to the collapse of Enron and subsequent scandal involving
Arthur Andersen and the need to restore confidence in the United
States securities markets.'00 The problems discussed included those
relating to disparities among state laws.10' Even the quoted statement
above, regarding the intent that the legislation "sweep broadly," was
made in connection with an executive interpretation that would have
prevented individual whistleblowers from "[s]imply picking up the
phone and calling [his or her] local Senator or Representative to re-
port a case of securities fraud," but made no reference to application
of the provision abroad. 10 2 The context of Senator Leahy's statements
illustrates the decidedly domestic focus of language that could be in-
terpreted to imply extraterritorial effect. The First Circuit found that
these discussions of the Whistleblower Provision were domestic in na-
ture and did not support implying a congressional intent to grant the
provision extraterritorial effect.' 03
Limiting the Whistleblower Provision to apply only within the
United States, based on legislative inattention to the potential interna-
ducting an authorized investigation. Id. Leahy addressed the Senate on January 29, 2003 to
report that the executive interpretation had been changed to protect whistleblowers who
disclosed information regarding corporate fraud to any member of Congress. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2006).
100. 148 CONG. Ric. S1785-S1786 (2002).
101. 148 CONG. REC. S1788.
102. 149 CONG. REC. S1725 (2003).
103. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 14-15. After determining that the legislative history did not
support extraterritorial application of the Whistleblower Provision, the First Circuit ex-
amined the few administrative decisions dealing with the extraterritorial application of the
provision. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's regional administrator
and the Department of Labor's Administrative Law Judges held, on at least three occa-
sions, that the Whistleblower Provision did not apply extraterritorially. Id. at 17-18 (refer-
encing the three earlier decisions: Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2004-SOX-22
(OSHA Reg'l Adm'r) (Dec. 19, 2003); Concone v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 2005-SOX-6
(ALJ) (Dec. 3, 2004); Ede v. Swatch Group, 2004-SOX-68, 2004-SOX-69 (ALJ) (Jan. 14,
2005)). The Department of Labor, the agency responsible for receiving and investigating
administrative whistleblower complaints under the Whistleblower Provision, did not issue a
statement of policy on the extraterritorial application of the Whistleblower Provision. Id. at
17.
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tional implications of the provision, seems troubling and counterintui-
tive in light of the important policy concerns raised by the Enron
scandal and Congress's stated purpose in crafting the legislation. Con-
gress intended to enact broadly-sweeping legislation to protect em-
ployees of publicly-traded companies who served the public interest by
reporting corporate improprieties. Although the lack of explicit con-
gressional attention to the extraterritorial application of the statute is
undeniable, it is less clear whether this inattention was purposeful or
merely a congressional oversight. Nonetheless, the lack of expressed
congressional intent makes this troubling outcome proper under the
territoriality presumption.
3. The Lingering Questions of Policy: When, if Ever, Can the
Territoriality Presumption Be Overcome?
a. The Overarching Purpose of the Whistleblower Provision Will
Not Be Accomplished Without Extraterritorial Effect
As previously discussed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted as a
means of investor protection, guarding against fraud in order to pro-
tect investors and the integrity of the United States securities mar-
kets. 104 The Whistleblower Provision serves this purpose by preventing
retaliation against employees who come forward to provide informa-
tion and participate in investigations of frauds committed by their
employers.
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,10 5 the Second Circuit recognized the
importance of such policy concerns regarding United States securities
markets.10 6 The court found that Congress intended the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934107 to have extraterritorial reach, regulating trans-
actions outside the United States, at least when the transactions
involve stocks listed on a United States securities market and are detri-
mental to the interests of American investors. 10 8 The court based its
decision on policy concerns and cited the importance of extraterrito-
rial application of the Securities Exchange Act to protect domestic
investors purchasing foreign securities and to "protect the domestic
securities market from the [negative] effects of improper foreign
104. Id. at 11. See also SEC Release No. 33-8177 (Jan. 31, 2003).
105. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
106. Id. at 206.
107. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
108. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
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transactions in ... [United States] securities."' 0 9 The court stated that
"neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial application of
legislation nor the specific language ... show Congressional intent to
preclude application of the Exchange Act . . . when extraterritorial
application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors."' 10
The reasoning employed by the court in Schoenbaum supports
finding implied congressional intent for extraterritorial effect of the
Whistleblower Provision because the protection of United States inves-
tors and markets cannot be fully accomplished without extraterritorial
application of the provision.' In the global economy, many United
States parent companies have spawned fully functioning foreign sub-
sidiaries beyond the traditional territorial reach of congressional legis-
lation. There can be little doubt that frauds uncovered by
whistleblowers employed by these foreign subsidiaries present a threat
to the integrity of United States securities markets comparable to the
threat created by frauds committed domestically by the United States
parent company. 112 To the same extent that extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was necessary to protect
investors in Schoenbaum, extraterritorial application of the
Whistleblower Provision is required to protect United States investors
and securities markets. Without such effect, investors and markets will
be more vulnerable to frauds committed by foreign subsidiaries of
United States parent companies.
In deciding Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit inverted the typical
inquiry by focusing not on whether Congress intended to extend juris-
diction, but rather on whether they intended to precludejurisdiction. 113
This outcome-determinative approach was presumably adopted in or-
der to effectuate the protection of American investors, but it is not the
inquiry mandated by the territoriality presumption. The court may
have taken this more liberal approach to finding implied intent based
109. Id. at 206.
110. Id.
111. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006).
112. The First Circuit recognized the impact frauds against foreign subsidiaries could
have on the United States parent company, but did not find this sufficiently persuasive to
deviate from the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Whistleblower Pro-
vision. Id. at 8. See infra Part II.B.l.a for a discussion of the impact foreign subsidiaries of
companies listed in the United States securities markets have on the performance of the
parent company.
113. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the court's view that the
presumption against extraterritoial effect and the text of the Act do not "show Congres-
sional intent to preclude [extraterritoial] application . Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206
(emphasis added)).
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on specific language included in section two of the Securities Ex-
change Act,I 14 which states that "transactions in securities . . . are af-
fected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to
provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of prac-
tices ... and to impose requirements necessary to make such regula-
tion and control reasonably complete and effective."' 1 5 A textual analysis of
section two of the Securities Exchange Act could lead to the reasona-
ble conclusion that Congress intended all provisions of that Act to
have the necessary territorial jurisdiction to further the "national pub-
lic interest" in regulating transactions in securities.'1 6 This interpreta-
tion of other language in the Securities Exchange Act could provide
the basis for the inverted inquiry employed by the Schoenbaum
court.
117
The purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-to provide comprehen-
sive protection for United States investors and guard the integrity of
United States securities markets-may be frustrated unless the
Whistleblower Provision is granted extraterritorial effect. As previously
discussed, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of
one of the most devastating corporate scandals in recent history.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that legislators would have wanted
to uphold the purpose of the act by granting the Whistleblower Provi-
sion the necessary territorial reach to fully protect investors in the
United States securities markets. However, under the territoriality pre-
sumption, the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is but one considera-
tion, and it is not sufficient to overcome the presumption against
finding extraterritorial effect when Congress has not expressly
granted such broad territorial reach.
b. Congress Is Capable of Crafting Legislation that Has
Extraterritorial Effect
Before implying a congressional intent where one is not clearly
expressed, the courts should consider that Congress is aware of the
need to make a clear statement that it intends legislative action to
apply extraterritorially. As discussed in Aramco, congressional recogni-
tion of the need to make a clear statement that a statute is intended to
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. The Schoenbaum court may also have been influenced by a line of cases involving
antitrust litigation and employing the effects test approach to analyzing extraterritoriality.
See infra Part 1I.B.
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apply to foreign conduct is demonstrated by the numerous occasions
in which legislation contains an express grant of extraterritorial juris-
diction.1 18 If, through some act of legislative oversight, a statute that is
intended to apply extraterritorially does not contain an express grant,
Congress is free to amend the legislation to clarify and expressly im-
part extraterritorial effect. 1 9 This was the case with the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act 120 ("ADEA") discussed in Aramco.1 21 After
several courts held that the ADEA did not apply overseas, Congress
amended the ADEA to provide for extraterritorial effect.1 22 Thus, it is
wise for courts to generally assume, absent evidence to the contrary,
that Congress is aware of the intricacies of passing legislation and re-
frain from implying intent in most circumstances.
4. The Territorial Presumption: The Whistleblower Provision Will
Not Be Granted Extraterritorial Effect
Under the statutory interpretation analysis mandated by the terri-
toriality presumption, the Whistleblower Provision does not have the
characteristic markers of intended extraterritorial effect. Without the
express earmarks of congressional intent to impart extraterritorial ef-
fect, the policy considerations behind the Whistleblower Provision-
specifically, the desire to protect United States investors and markets
against fraud-will not sustain the expansion of its reach simply be-
cause such an expansion would provide another means of accomplish-
ing this goal. As the First Circuit stated, "whatever help to investors its
overseas application might in theory provide is offset . . . by the ab-
sence of any indication that Congress contemplated extraterritorial-
ity."1 2 3 Under the territoriality presumption, the First Circuit correctly
held that the Whistleblower Provision was not intended to reach for-
eign employees working outside the United States.' 24
However technically proper this holding may be under the terri-
toriality presumption, it is troubling when one considers the devastat-
ing impact of the Enron scandal and the concerns driving the
enactment of the Whistleblower Provision. This counterintuitive result
subverts, rather than upholds, the actual intent of Congress in crafting
118. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 258 (1991).
119. See id. at 258-259.
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
121. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258-259.
122. Id.
123. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 18.
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the Whistleblower Provision. To combat troubling outcomes of this
nature, another approach for analyzing the extraterritorial effect of
legislation in the field of securities regulation must be employed.
B. Analysis #2: The Effects Test as Applied to the Whisteblower
Provision
The territoriality presumption analysis is only one of the methods
used by the Supreme Court to determine the extraterritorial effect of
congressional legislation.' 25 As previously mentioned, the Supreme
Court has also embraced an effects test analysis of extraterritorial ef-
fect. 126 This analysis departs from the rigid approach of the territorial-
ity presumption and refocuses the inquiry on the effect that an action
taken abroad has within the United States.
In evaluating the benefits of adopting an effects test approach for
analyzing the extraterritorial effect of legislation in the field of securi-
ties regulation, a comparison to the field of antitrust, with its equally
compelling international concerns, is informative. The Supreme
Court initially adopted the territoriality presumption when it consid-
ered the extraterritorial effect of the Sherman Act,1 27 one of the most
often invoked provisions in antitrust legislation. 128 Over the next sev-
eral decades, a series of cases involving the international application
of the Sherman Act challenged this limited view of the Act's territorial
reach. 129 Judge Learned Hand was the first to fully depart from the
traditional territoriality presumption with his 1945 decision, United
States v. Aluminum Company of America ("Alcod'). 13o
In Alcoa, the United States government filed an antitrust com-
plaint alleging the unlawful pursuit of exclusionary market practices
and monopolization of the production and sale of aluminum ingot.13 1
125. See BORN, supra note 13, at 595. Until the First Circuit adopted the territoriality
presumption in Carnero, the presumption had never been applied to securities regulation.
Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May
3, 2006) (No. 05-1397).
126. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
128. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding that the
Sherman Act did not reach the allegedly anti-competitive behavior of a United States cor-
poration if that behavior took place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States).
129. See BORN, supra note 13, at 578. The shortcomings of the territoriality presump-
tion, when applied to fields that require participation in international conduct, may have
prompted a shift away from the territoriality presumption and towards the effects test, in
the field of antitrust. Id.
130. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also BORN, supra note 13, at 578.
131. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 423.
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The government alleged that agreements entered into by the defen-
dant violated section one of the Sherman Act, which makes illegal
"[e]very contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce." 132 The general character of the agreements was that
"[n]o shareholder was to 'buy, borrow, fabricate or sell' aluminum
produced by anyone not a shareholder except with the consent of the
board of governors, but [the consent] must not be 'unreasonably
withheld.'" 13 3 Neither of the agreements explicitly included imports
into the United States. 134 As the agreements allegedly violating section
one of the Sherman Act were not entered into in the United States, 135
the court was called upon to evaluate the extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act.
In deciding the case, Judge Hand crafted a new approach for de-
termining the extraterritorial reach of legislation. Judge Hand's for-
mulation of an effects test provided that the Sherman Act would cover
conduct occurring outside the United States if two requirements were
satisfied: (1) the conduct was intended to affect United States imports,
and (2) the conduct actually had an effect in the United States. 13 6 The
court held that the agreements at issue were unlawful under the Sher-
man Act because the "agreements would clearly have been unlawful,
had they been made within the United States; and it follows from what
we have just said that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they
were intended to affect imports and did affect them. '13 7
The effects test was most recently applied by the Supreme Court
in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.138 In Hartford Fire Insurance,
the Court considered the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act to London-based reinsurers. 13 9 The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants conspired in violation of section one of the Sherman Act to
force primary insurers to change the terms of their insurance policies
to conform with the policies of the defendant insurance compa-
nies.1 40 Writing for a narrow majority of five justices, Justice Souter
132. BORN, supra note 13, at 577 (citing section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2000)).
133. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 442.
134. Id. at 442-43. Imports into the United States were discussed during the prepara-
tion of one of the agreements and the shareholders agreed that imports into the United
States should be included in the quotas. Id.
135. Id. at 444.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
139. Id. at 794-95.
140. Id. at 770-71.
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reaffirmed the effects test in finding that the London defendants' ac-
tions were meant to produce and did produce substantial effects in
the United States, and the principles of international comity did not
counsel against exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign
defendants. 14 1
1. The Effects Test: Recognizing that an Effect Within the United
States Should Extend the Reach of Legislation in the
Field of Securities Regulation
Although the effects test has been used primarily in antitrust
cases, its application is not limited. Legislation in the field of securities
regulation, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is comparable to anti-
trust in that it is the type of legislation that must be interpreted with
an eye toward the interconnected global economy. To be wholly effec-
tive, the territorial reach of legislation dealing with securities regula-
tion must extend to foreign conduct that "was meant to produce and
did in fact produce some substantial effect"1 42 on United States securi-
ties markets.
The purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the
Enron scandal, is to protect United States investors and the integrity
of the United States securities markets by regulating against corporate
accounting impropriety, particularly corporate fraud. 43 In a global
economy, accomplishing this purpose will necessarily involve dealing
with commercial transactions on an international level. This requires
that courts look beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States
and interpret the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to apply to all transactions that
are intended to produce and actually do produce some substantial
effect on the United States securities markets.
The Whistleblower Provision was designed to further the goals of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by fighting a corporate culture in which em-
ployees who report corporate fraud and impropriety are vulnerable to
retaliation. 144 The provision is an important measure in eradicating
the widespread accounting improprieties revealed in the wake of the
Enron scandal. In his introduction of the bill, Senator Leahy discussed
a letter from the National Whistleblower Center proclaiming the
Whistleblower Provision to be "the single most effective measure pos-
141. Id. at 798-99.
142. Id. at 796.
143. See 148 CONG. REc. S1786 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Falencki, supra note
2, at 1213-14.
144. 148 CONG. REc. S1792.
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sible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle and similar threats
to the nation's financial markets."1 45 Although the Whistleblower Pro-
vision has characteristics of both employment legislation, which is tra-
ditionally not applied extraterritorially, 146 and securities regulation, it
plays an integral role in accomplishing the goals of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. To uphold the purpose and objectives of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the extraterritorial effect of the Whistleblower Provision
should be analyzed in light of its function as legislation in the field
securities regulation.
The effects test affords a court more flexibility to consider both
policy concerns and implied congressional intent in deciding if the
effect produced in the United States will support a finding that the
Whistleblower Provision applies extraterritorially. This flexibility al-
lows the court to examine the potential benefits realized by imparting
extraterritorial effect in light of the legislation's purpose. The court is
no longer constrained by the presumption that ambiguous and in-
complete statutory language or legislative history requires a restriction
on the legislation's territorial reach that will subvert, rather than up-
hold, the legislation's purpose. In the case of the Whistleblower Provi-
sion, a court employing the effects test would have more leeway to
examine the benefits of protecting whistleblowers abroad, taking into
account ambiguously-stated congressional intent that the legislation
"sweep broadly." The deciding court would have more latitude to de-
termine if, although not expressly prohibited by the legislation, the
behavior such whistleblowers protect against produces the type of ef-
fect in the United States that Congress intended to protect against.
The court would also have the ability to consider the practical applica-
tion of the statute in the real world and to respond to unforeseen
international implications of the legislation.
145. Id.
146. Dating back to the Foley Brothers decision in 1948, the Court has recognized the
uniquely local implications of employment regulations. Foley Brothers, 336 U.S. at 286. The
Court in Aramco also recognized the difficulty of exporting employment legislation and,
without clear evidence of congressional intent, the Court was "unwilling to ascribe . .. a
policy which would raise difficult questions of international law by imposing this country's
employment-discrimination regime upon foreign corporations operating in foreign com-
merce." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 255 (1991). Applying the Whistleblower Provision extraterritorially to allow for-
eign employees working abroad at the foreign subsidiaries of United States parent compa-
nies, thereby allowing the foreign employee to bring suit against the United States parent
company, does not raise the same concerns as regulating corporations operating entirely
outside the borders of the United States.
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a. Foreign Subsidiary Conduct: The Intended and Actual Effects
of Retaliatory Termination of Employment in the United
States
The first inquiry mandated by the effects test is whether the con-
duct to be regulated was intended to produce an effect in the United
States. 147 An employee of a foreign subsidiary filing suit against a
United States parent company under the Whistleblower Provision
must establish the intended effect of the alleged retaliatory conduct
based on the individual circumstances of his or her case. Under the
first prong of the effects test, the alleged retaliatory conduct would
only merit extraterritorial application of the Whistleblower Provision
if the conduct itself was intended to have an effect in the United
States. 148
One situation in which foreign subsidiary conduct could be in-
tended to affect the United States is in the case of ongoing corporate
fraud. Logic dictates that whistleblowers fired in retaliation for report-
ing corporate fraud are fired because they pose a threat to the contin-
uation of that fraud. Fraudulent subsidiary activities, including
creating false invoices and inflating sales figures, may be intended to
increase the net income of the parent company. If the firing of the
subsidiary whistleblower is intended to facilitate the continued corpo-
rate impropriety at the subsidiary, and if that impropriety is intended
to affect the financial statements of the United States parent com-
pany, it could be argued that the retaliatory firing was intended to
produce an effect in the United States. Although such an effect in the
United States is indirect, if an Enron-like scandal involving the United
States parent company were to occur, it is likely that investors in the
parent company would have preferred early disclosure of the corpo-
rate fraud regardless of whether the disclosure was made by a
whistleblower in the United States or at a foreign subsidiary.
Carnero alleges that he was fired in retaliation for "blowing the
whistle" on the accounting misconduct of BSC's Latin American sub-
sidiaries. 149 Although the First Circuit made no findings regarding the
intended effect of firing Carnero, a court could reasonably find that
the alleged retaliatory firing was intended to facilitate the continua-
tion of the fraudulent activity, thereby affecting the financial state-
ments of BSC, the parent company listed in the United States on the
147. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir.
1945).
148. See Alcoa, 146 F.2d at 444.
149. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 2-3 (lst Cir. 2006).
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New York Stock Exchange. If the alleged improprieties of the Latin
American subsidiaries were meant to artificially increase the stock
price of BSC or in any other way defraud American investors or under-
mine the integrity of the United States securities markets, then the
court could find that the subsidiaries intended to produce an effect in
the United States. This would support extraterritorial application of
the Whistleblower Provision if the court further determined that
Carnero was fired in retaliation for reporting the fraudulent activity,
and to ensure that the impropriety continued. These findings would
be commensurate with the expressed congressional intent that the
legislation "sweep broadly" to protect any employee who acted to "pro-
tect investors and the market.' '1 50
If it is established that the alleged retaliatory conduct was in-
tended to produce an effect in the United States, the court will then
determine if the impropriety actually produced an effect in the
United States. 15 1 As the territoriality presumption is not concerned
with the negative effect an action abroad may have in the United
States, the First Circuit did not inquire as to the actual effects pro-
duced by the alleged impropriety at BSA and BSB. However, a previ-
ous instance of fraud perpetrated by a Japanese subsidiary of BSC
indicates that subsidiary fraud at BSA and BSB is likely to produce an
actual effect in the United States.' 52
In In re Boston Scientific Corp., the SEC found that between March
1997 and June 1998 Boston Scientific Japan, KK ("BSJ") recorded
false sales and earnings data and reported the data to BSC.153 The
fraudulent reports by BSJ caused BSC to overstate net income in 1997
and the first two quarters of 1998 by a total of nearly fifty million dol-
lars.' 54 Although BSC discovered the fraudulent activity in the fall of
1998 and restated its financial filings to reflect the impact of the
fraud, the reports filed with the SEC in 1997 and the first two quarters
of 1998 contained material misstatements of income and losses in vio-
150. 149 CONG. REc. S1725 (2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
151. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. The magnitude of effect required to satisfy this prong of
the effects test is somewhat disputed. Many lower courts refuse to grant extraterritorial
effect when the effects within the United States are merely speculative. See, e.g., Montreal
Trading v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981). Hartford Fire Insurance implicitly
adopts a "substantial effects" threshold in its holding. 509 U.S. at 796.
152. See In re Boston Scientific Corp., Securities Exchange Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-10272, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1705, at *1 (S.E.C. Aug. 21, 2000).
153. Id. at *2-3. The total amount of misstated revenue was later determined to be in
excess of seventy-five million dollars. Id. at *6.
154. Id. at *7.
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lation of the Exchange Act of 1934.' 55 The SEC accepted an offer of
settlement by BSC 156 and entered an order that BSC cease and desist
from committing or causing the violations. 157
Under the effects test approach, extraterritorial application is
proper when conduct is both intended to affect the United States and
actually produces an effect within the United States.158 Fraudulent ac-
tivities perpetrated by a foreign subsidiary of a United States parent
company may be intended to increase the net income, or decrease the
net losses, of the parent company. As illustrated in In re Boston Scientific
Corp., foreign subsidiary fraud can result in significant problems with
the accuracy of SEC filings mandated by the Exchange Act of 1934,
thereby producing an actual effect within the United States. 159 If later
revealed, the subsidiary's improprieties are likely to have a significant
impact on public confidence in the parent company and may well af-
fect the performance of the parent company in the United States se-
curities market.1 60 Retaliation against a whistleblower who serves the
public interest by reporting foreign subsidiary fraud perpetrated with
an eye toward affecting the United States parent company merits ex-
traterritorial application of the Whistleblower Provision under the ef-
fects test analysis when it can be shown that the retaliation
perpetuated the fraud and produced an actual effect within the
United States.
155. Id. at *9-12. The fraudulent activity of BSJ caused BSC to materially misstate net
income and losses in its annual report for 1997 and quarterly reports filed in 1997 and
1998, which placed BSC in violation of several sections of the Exchange Act. The misstate-
ments were a violation of section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires that informa-
tion filed pursuant to the Exchange Act must be accurate and complete, because the
financial reports contained materially inaccurate information. Id. at *9. The misstatements
also violated section 13(b) (2) (A) of the Exchange Act, which requires that an issuer of
securities must keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect its transactions,
and section 13(b) (2) (B) of the Exchange Act, which requires that issuers maintain internal
accounting controls to prevent transactions from being improperly recorded. Id. at
*10-12.
156. The commission accepted BSC's offer of settlement in light of the remedial action
taken by BSC and the company's cooperation with the commission. Id. at *12-13.
157. Id. at *13.
158. See Alcoa, 146 F.2d at 444.
159. See supra note 155 (illustrating the actual effects produced in the United States by
a Japanese subsidiary of BSC).
160. See, e.g., Scott Reckard, Syncor Seeks SEC Filing Extension, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002,
at C3 (reporting that a disclosure by Syncor International Corporation that it was investi-
gating possible bribes to foreign officials made by its foreign subsidiaries "cut its stock price
in half'); Travis Purser, Syncor Rebounds but Credibility Issues Remain, L.A. Bus. J., Nov. 18,
2002, at 14 (noting that, although stock prices had rebounded from the trading low of
$16.90 to $25.69, experts believed that Syncor's biggest problem would be repairing the
damage that the disclosure of bribes to foreign officials had done to its credibility).
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b. When Do the Principles of Comity Counsel Against
Extraterritorial Application in the Effects Test Analysis?
Hartford Fire Insurance reached the Supreme Court following a
long line of cases holding that the Sherman Act applied to foreign
conduct that "was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States."'161 Therefore, the Court did
not focus on congressional intent regarding extraterritorial effect, but
instead asked whether the district court should have declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction based on the principles of international comity. 162 In
deciding this question, the majority sought to determine whether
there was a "true conflict between domestic and foreign law."' 63 The
Court found that, because the London reinsurers were not required
by British law to act in some manner prohibited by the United States
and that compliance with the laws of both countries was not impossi-
ble, no true conflict of laws existed.1 64 As there was no conflict of laws,
the Court found that the principle of international comity did not
counsel against exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the
London-based reinsurers. 165
If a district court finds that the alleged retaliatory conduct sup-
ports extraterritorial application of the Whistleblower Provision, it
should only decline to exercise jurisdiction based on the principle of
international comity if there is a true conflict of laws between the pro-
tections afforded by the Whistleblower Provision and the laws of the
other country. In Hartford Fire Insurance, the Court stated that "[n]o
conflict exists . . . 'where a person subject to regulation by two states
can comply with the laws of both."'166 Under the standard enunciated
by the majority in Hartford Fire Insurance, this would not have been a
problem in Carnero unless BSA and BSB presented evidence sufficient
161. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
162. Id. at 798.
163. Id. (quoting Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. United States District
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)).
164. Id. at 799.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403, Comment e). This
is a somewhat controversial understanding of international comity. The majority in Hart-
ford Fire Insurance focused on only one factor in the section 403 test-the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by another state-to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable and treated that factor as dispositive without conducting a balancing of the
other seven factors. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2) (a)-(h). See Rob-
ert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Comity, and the Extraterritorial Reach of United States
Antitrust Laws, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 204-09 (1994) for a discussion of the controversy
surrounding Justice Souter's interpretation of international comity.
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to satisfy the court that compliance with both the laws of their respec-
tive countries and the anti-fraud provisions violated by the alleged im-
proper accounting practices was impossible.
2. The Effects Test: The Whistleblower Provision May Be Granted
Extraterritorial Effect
Under the effects test, a court will find that the Whistleblower
Provision should have extraterritorial effect when: (1) the alleged re-
taliatory conduct was intended to have an effect in the United States,
and (2) the conduct actually had such an effect. This expansion of
extraterritorial application addresses many of the policy concerns that
make the limited notion of extraterritorial effect under the territorial-
ity presumption so troubling. Under the effects test, the deciding
court has more flexibility to determine if the conduct to be regulated
has significant impact within the United States and is, therefore, the
type of conduct to which the legislation should apply.
Congress enacted the Whistleblower Provision to combat a corpo-
rate culture in which employees who report impropriety are vulnera-
ble to retaliation. 167 Whistleblowers are less likely to come forward
with reports of corporate fraud and impropriety at foreign subsidiar-
ies of United States parent companies if they fear losing their jobs or
suffering other retaliation. 16 3 If foreign subsidiary whistleblowers are
less likely to come forward, subsidiary fraud is less likely to be ex-
posed. Such subsidiary fraud can cause a United States parent com-
pany to overstate net income, or understate net losses, in reports filed
with the SEC.169 This misstatement has the potential to wipe out in-
vestments in the parent company, listed in the United States securities
markets, if and when the subsidiary fraud is revealed.' 7 0 This is the
impact on United States investors and securities markets that Con-
gress sought to prevent when the Whistleblower Provision was
enacted.
167. 148 CONG. REC. S1792 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
168. In his brief to the First Circuit, Carnero detailed the retaliation he experienced
after reporting that BSA and BSB created false invoices and inflated sales figures, but
before his eventual termination. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10-12, Carnero v. Boston
Scientific Corporation, Nos. 04-2291 and 04-1801 (consolidated) (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 2004).
After reporting the alleged impropriety, Carnero learned that other BSC employees made
false allegations accusing him of "unethical conduct." Id. at 11. Carnero requested an in-
vestigation into the allegations made against him, but BSC was unresponsive. Id.
169. See In re Boston Scientific Corp., Securities Exchange Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-10272, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1705, at *1 (S.E.C. Aug. 21, 2000).
170. See Chiara & Orenstein, supra note 32, at 236 (discussing the role misstatements in
financial filings played in the Enron scandal).
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The effects test analysis refocuses the inquiry on the location of
the effect rather than on the location of the action against which Con-
gress sought to legislate. If the effect in the United States is substan-
tial, it is not unreasonable to consider the action as within the scope
of domestic concerns Congress presumably has in mind when enact-
ing legislation.171 In such situations, the substantial effect within the
territorial bounds of the United States supports this assumption re-
gardless of the action's physical location. When granted extraterrito-
rial effect, the Whistleblower Provision more effectively upholds
congressional intent that the legislation "protect[ I any employee...
who took such reasonable action to try to protect investors and the
market.' 72 In this era of increasing globalization, the important inter-
ests motivating the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-specifically
the protection of United States investors and the integrity of the
United States securities markets-are better served if certain provi-
sions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as the Whistleblower Provision,
reach beyond the physical territory of the United States. In the ab-
sence of a clear statement of extraterritorial reach, it is only through
application of the effects test that courts are allowed the flexibility to
determine if the overarching purpose of legislation is best served by
allowing an intended and actual effect in the United States to support
extraterritorial effect.
HI. Conclusion
In the increasingly global economy where many United States
corporations operate numerous foreign subsidiaries, it is likely that
the courts will again be called upon to decide if the Whistleblower
Provision should be granted extraterritorial effect. The granting of ex-
traterritorial effect would allow covered employees working abroad
for a foreign subsidiary to bring suit against the United States parent
company for allegedly retaliatory conduct that took place outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States. When the issue is raised,
the court faced with the decision may choose to follow the First Cir-
cuit's lead and employ the territoriality presumption. However, as this
Comment has illustrated, an analysis of the Whistleblower Provision
under the territoriality presumption is likely to result in a finding that
the provision is without extraterritorial effect. This undercuts the pur-
pose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by limiting the protection that the
Whistleblower Provision provides. Such a decision has the potential to
171. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
172. 149 CONG. Ric. S1725 (2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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discourage employees working overseas for foreign subsidiaries of
United States parent companies from coming forward to report cor-
porate fraud that will eventually make its way back to the United
States. If the next court to confront the issue employs the territoriality
presumption, its restrictive approach and inability to fully respond to
important policy considerations will likely lead to the troubling result
reached by the First Circuit-that the Whistleblower Provision does
not apply extraterritorially.
Without a decision by the Supreme Court declaring that the ex-
traterritorial effect of the Whistleblower Provision should be governed
by the territoriality presumption, the next court to decide the issue
may forego its restrictive approach in favor of the more flexible effects
test analysis. The flexibility of the effects test allows a court to consider
the application of legislation in an international context as it arises
and to uphold the goals of the legislation, even when congressional
intent that the provision be granted extraterritorial effect is not ex-
plicitly stated. The effects test better upholds the purpose of the
Whistleblower Provision by extending its protections to employees of
foreign subsidiaries who are retaliated against if the retaliation was
intended to produce an effect in the United States and actually pro-
duced such an effect. Extending the Whistleblower Provision to cover
these employees will encourage reporting of foreign subsidiary fraud
that is intended to affect the United States securities markets, thereby
protecting both investors and the integrity of the markets.
This Comment seeks to expose the inherent difficulty in allowing
competing analytical approaches for determining the extraterritorial
effect of congressional action to exist simultaneously: the results
reached under the two approaches will not always be the same. In
declining to hear this case, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity
to either clarify the analysis of extraterritorial effect of the
Whistleblower Provision or to set the standard for the analyzing the
extraterritoriality of legislation in the field of securities regulation.
Without such guidance, there will likely be confusion among lower
courts and litigants when dealing with the potential extraterritorial
application of both the Whistleblower Provision and other provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that are silent as to their territorial reach.
Should another opportunity arise, the Court should adopt the flexibil-
ity of the effects test to analyze legislation enacted in the field of secur-
ities regulation as it is better suited to deal with ambiguously-stated
congressional intent and the likelihood that such legislation will have
unanticipated international implications.
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